



A view of the intellectual legacy of Karl Marx *
ANATOL RAPOPORT
A dispassionate discussion of Marxism as an intellectual heritage has
been persistently difficult because of the strong philosophical commitments
and political polarization of its adherents and its opponents. However,
with the passage of time and the gaining of perspective, an evaluation
becomes easier. It appears, in fact, that the legacy of Marxism derives
great value precisely from the intensity of the controversies that have
ranged around it.
It has been fashionable for a while in the United States (a legacy of
logical positivism) to declare all purely philosophical disputes to be &dquo; mean-
ingless &dquo;. They can readily be made to appear so by rigid demands
for operational definitions, for specifications of verification procedures,
and so on. There are, however, many criteria of meaningfulness, and one
of importance is the extent to which a controversy reflects fundamental
clashing commitments. It may well happen that the issues of the contro-
versy are &dquo; meaningless &dquo; in the sense of not being rooted in empirical
criteria of meaning, but the actual results of the controversy may never-
theless be of vital significance to intellectual history. These results make
the controversy meaningful in retrospect.
An instructive example of this effect of philosophical dispute can
be seen in the running controversy between the &dquo; mechanists &dquo; and the
&dquo; vitalists &dquo; in biology, much of which was conducted on the metaphysical
rather than on the scientific plane. The mechanists were those who
* This article was presented as a paper for the Symposium on the influence of
Karl Marx on contemporary scientific thought, Paris, May 8-10, 1968, organized under
the auspices of Unesco by the International Social Science Council and the International
Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies.
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maintained that life processes should be explained entirely on the basis
of known physical and chemical laws. The vitalists insisted that a special
&dquo; life force &dquo;, or &dquo; vital principle &dquo;, guided the living processes. The
question, as it is put, cannot be settled on scientific grounds. It is a philo-
sophical question, to which one gives an answer in accordance with one’s
ideational commitments. Clearly, no matter how many of the specific
life processes (e.g., physiological events) the mechanists could show to
be derivable from the physico-chemical matrix of the events in question,
the vitalists were not thereby obligated to abandon their view, since these
events could constitute only a minute fraction of the enormously complex
processes which we call life.
Fortunately for the development of biology, not all vitalists confined their
arguments to the philosophical level. Some cited specific phenomena
which, they maintained, implied the operation of vital forces. As these
phenomena were shown to be derivable from known physical laws, the
arguments of the vitalists were refuted. In a way, the maturation of the
biological sciences coincides with the abandonment by the vitalists of a
sequence of positions. With the synthesis of urea (1828), for example,
it became clear that no special &dquo; vital force &dquo; was involved in the production
of the so-called organic compounds. The application of the principles
of thermodynamics to biochemical reactions failed to reveal any unaccount-
ed for sources of energy in living beings. The discovery of the condi-
tioned response laid the foundations for a 
&dquo; materialistic &dquo; theory of
modification of behavior, hence essentially of learning. And now prin-
ciples of cybernetics are providing the foundation of a theory in which
purposeful and &dquo; intelligent &dquo; behavior can be deduced as a consequence
of an organized arrangement of material units.
Can we say, then, that vitalism has been &dquo; defeated &dquo; or, in view
of its continued retreat, is doomed to final defeat as an outlook? An anti-
vitalist might say so, if what he values most is a sense of triumph over
philosophical opponents. I too am an anti-vitalist; but I do not think
that vitalism has been &dquo; defeated &dquo;. I would rather say that responsible
vitalism has served the purpose of a catalyst in the maturation of biology;
has served as a challenge, if you will. In their retreat &dquo; to previously
prepared positions &dquo; the vitalists invited an attack on those positions and
so provided grist for the intellectual mill.
What is more significant, however, is that as vitalism retreated the
anti-vitalist philosophy of biology radically changed. The anti-vitalist
can no longer call himself a mechanist in the original sense of the word.
Life processes, it has turned out, cannot be explained by purely mechanical
models, such as the clockwork analogies of Descartes. The &dquo; physical
explanation &dquo; of today is widely different from the physical explanations
of the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the nineteenth centuries. In retro-
spect we see the classical process at work : the thesis of mechanism clashing
with the anti-thesis of vitalism, resulting in a sequence of syntheses in which
neither of the positions appears in its original guise.
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This is the sort of process that might manifest itself in the development
of social science if Marxist and anti-Marxist positions could interact in
a creative way, each challenging the other on specific issues, compelling
the antagonists to descend from the level of philosophical dispute to the
examination of concrete events. It may still come to pass. If so, what
emerges may consign all the tenaciously held positions to the museum
of intellectual history; not to the &dquo; dust bin &dquo; or the &dquo; graveyard &dquo;, as
those would have it who see every clash of philosophies as a battle, but
to the museum where they will remain enshrined as monuments to the
search for truth.
It is the fate of every scientific theory to be eventually proven to be
&dquo; wrong &dquo;. To deny this is to deny the dialectics of science. To refute
a theory, however, is not to declare it worthless. Refuted theories have
not lived in vain any more than mortal men have lived in vain. A signi-
ficant theory, even though refuted, lives on in its successors. I think it
is worthwhile to keep this in mind when the content of Marx’s socio-
economic theories is challenged or defended on scientific grounds.
MARXISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
A central idea in the Marxist approach to the theory of social change
is that scientific inquiry need not be confined to the non-human universe
(physical and biological science) but can be extended also to man, in parti-
cular, to social man and and his works. &dquo; Man &dquo; and &dquo; social man &dquo;
are synonymous terms in the Marxist lexicon. Indeed, from the point
of view of the Marxist outlook, the social aspects of man’s existence are
primary to the emergence of the individual psyche. There is good evidence
for this view. If we can draw conclusions from observations on social
primates, we can easily infer that the humanoid became social before he
became man. Thus the point of departure in Marxist social philosophy
is the social complex from which man’s individual consciousness has
emerged and by which it is molded. This view is diametrically opposed
to the 18th century view of the origin of society as a conglomeration of
initially (and ideally) autonomous psychological units.
The 18th century view is worth examining more closely because it
still prevails in countries with the strongest culturally individualist bias
against Marxist social philosophy, for example, in the United States.
Specifically, we read in the Declaration of Independence, for instance :
&dquo; That to secure these rights (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness)
governments are instituted among men &dquo;.
The statement can be understood in two ways : first, as an assertion
about the origin of organized social life; second, as a prescription of what
governments ought to be. The second interpretation, being a normative
one, is subject to dispute but hardly to empirical verification. The first
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interpretation, however, is descriptive, not normative, and hence can be
evaluated in the light of evidence. As a statement of fact, it is manifestly
false. Governments were not &dquo; instituted &dquo;. Organized social life
evolved in a continuum, first in the biological context among our pre-
human progenitors by the process of natural selection (like all other patterns
of living existence), later in human societies by some other (non-biolo-
gical) evolutionary principle. To be sure, on occasions people established
formal covenants with each other, but they could do so only because
they already had experience in organized social life; and this experience
reaches far into our pre-human past.
The Marxist model of society charts the course of social evolution
and names the principles which govern it. A methodological question
is immediately raised thereby. To what extent can man and his works
be understood in the light of the idea that society as an entity sui generis
has evolved as a consequence of certain &dquo; forces &dquo; acting on it from
the outside or generated from within it? The question ought to be
the central one in evaluating Marxist philosophy of social science.
There is a current in modern philosophy of science called general
systems theory. Its ideational source stems from biology and from some
philosophical ideas formulated rather vaguely by, among others, Alfred
North Whitehead. These ideas were a reaction, or a dialectical antithesis,
if you will, to the predominant direction of the scientific method, namely
the analytical approach. The analytic point of view seeks to understand
the whole by first gaining an understanding of the parts. The system point
of view, on the other hand, seeks to understand the parts by gaining an
insight into the nature of the whole (the system) of which the parts are
constituents.
As in many other confrontations of this sort, arguments about the
relative value of the two approaches are largely a waste of time. Each
has its place, and both are enhanced in value if they can be made to comple-
ment each other. The &dquo; reaction &dquo; against the analytic approach must
be seen as a reaction against its hegemony, not against its applications
where it is appropriate. When a methodology or an epistemology becomes
enshrined as the scientific method, it becomes stifling, for it chokes off
the opportunities for conceptual re-organization. Such re-organizations
are indispensable for the preservation of science as a creative, dynamic
method of cognition.
In fact, the analytic approach itself once played the role of an inno-
vating re-organization of concepts. Pre-cartesian geometry, being &dquo; syn-
thetic &dquo;, used configurations (polygons, circles, solids) as the units of
analysis, deriving the relations of their parts from the properties of the
wholes. Cartesian geometry, being analytic, introduced a revolutionary
organization of concepts. The elements (coordinates of points) became
the units of analysis. From the functional relations among these coordi-
nates (equations of lines, surfaces, etc.) the properties of configurations







branches of mathematics. Next, pre-galilean physics was &dquo; organismic &dquo;,
seeking to understand the motions of bodies on the basis of their &dquo; natures &dquo;,
&dquo; affinities &dquo;, and teleological 
&dquo; 
strivings &dquo;. In fact, pre-galilean physics
had a strong biological flavor. Galilean physics, on the other hand, was
analytic. It laid the foundations for the science of motion (kinematics)
by calling attention to the elements of motion. Upon these foundations
the mathematical bases of modern mechanics were laid. The differential
equation, the prototype description of a mechanical process, is actually
a representation of such a process analyzed into its infinitesimal consti-
tuent parts. Such have been the achievements of the analytic approach
when it was new, revolutionary, as it were.
Let us look at what happened after the analytic approach became
established as &dquo; the &dquo; scientific procedure. Classical economics was
an attempt to build up a picture of the economic process from postulated
inter-relations between primitive economic units (individual &dquo; producers &dquo;,
&dquo; traders &dquo; and &dquo; consumers &dquo;). Behaviorist psychology sought to under-
stand the behavior of an organism through the study of elementary stimulus-
response links. The empirical-pragmatic school of jurisprudence conceived
the emergence of law as the sum-total of 
&dquo; 
precedents &dquo;. Rigorization
of linguistics revealed the &dquo; structural units &dquo; of languages, a formidable
achievement; but for a long time the structural linguists confined themselves
to attempts to duplicate chemistry, as if the phonemes, morphemes, etc.,
were so many atoms and molecules whose &dquo; laws of combination &dquo; deter-
mined the properties of languages in the same way as the laws of combi-
nation of atoms and molecules determine the properties of matter. Even
in anthropology some schools of thought arose in which the culture com-
plexes were depicted in terms of catalogues of artifacts, customs, etc.
Granted that in many cases the extension of the analytic approach
to areas far beyond the physical sciences led to respectable achievements,
nonetheless the limitations of the approach soon became apparent. The
&dquo; laws of supply and demand &dquo; could not account for some of the most
salient features of modern economies ; stimulus-response psychology did
not penetrate into the basic nature of recognition, insight, conceptual-
ization, preference, not to speak of the deeper aspects of personality; lin-
guists soon found out that by excluding meaning from linguistics they
sterilized their science in both senses of the word.
The resurgence of a holistic, or organismic, point of view in modern
guise centers around the concept of system, a complex of inter-related
and inter-dependent parts. There is no need to deny that the properties
of the system are in principle deducible from the properties of the parts
and their inter-relations, and that therefore the analytic approach can be
in principle used in the service of understanding organic wholes in terms
of their parts. The question is not whether the analytic method is epis-
temologically sound, but rather concerns the limits of its applicability.
For example, it has been shown in statistical mechanics that the gross
principles of thermodynamics, that is, holistic properties of certain physical
12
systems, can be derived from the laws of mechanics and probability, applied
to the particles that compose the system. However, once the thermo-
dynamic laws are established, they can themselves be made points of
departure in the construction of macroscopic physical theories, into which
the microscopic concepts of particle mechanics do not enter.
Similary, certain sectors of psychology dealing with gestalt recognition,
concept formation, etc., can be developed without reference to the neural
events which underlie them. It is philosophically gratifying to assume
that patterns of neural events in their totality determine the psychological
states of the organism, that is, the gross properties of the &dquo; psychic system &dquo;
(or the &dquo; mind &dquo;, to use a somewhat discredited term). It is even more
gratifying to find links here and there between the &dquo; material &dquo; microcosm
and the &dquo; ideational &dquo; macrocosm. But there is little methodological
justification for refraining from pursuing the development of psychological
macro-theories, pending the establishment in all respects of a continuum
between neurophysiology and mental states. Similarly, it is not necessary
to build linguistics from the phoneme up before developing a theory of
language as a system in its own right with its own evolutionary laws.
In short, the system-theoretic approach permits the singling out for
study of any system of interest, with the view of establishing its system
properties, holding in abeyance the question of how these properties emerge
from the laws governing the elements of the system and their interactions.
The latter question should, of course, be examined. However, the point
of the matter is that the examination may be more enlightening after the
gross system properties have been understood.
To return to our example of thermodynamics, it will be recalled that
the gross thermodynamic principles were discovered before the connections
between them and molecular kinetics were established. In fact, it was
the former discoveries (e.g., the role of entropy in thermodynamic systems)
which instigated the investigations of statistical mechanics. Until ther-
modynamic principles came into the center of interest in physics and chemis-
try, there was no particular motivation for pursuing the implications of
the kinetic theory of matter.
Marx’s macro-sociology is an example par excellence of the system
approach to social science. Singling out, what to his way of thinking,
was the most important characteristic of human society, namely the division
of labor, he proceded to deduce the evolution of the structure of social
systems following the &dquo; impetus &dquo; of the institution of the division of
labor. Implicit in Marx’s evolutionary sociology is the idea that it is
the internal dynamics of a system which propels it, as it were, along the
path of development.
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THE BEING-CONSCIOUSNESS S D I C H O T O M Y,
AND REDUCTIONISM
A philosophical tenet of Marxism is that &dquo; being is primary, cons-
ciousness secondary &dquo; - a subject of endless and, in my opinion, largely
pointless disputes. Acclimatized as I am to the Anglo-Saxon empirico-
pragmatic atmosphere, I find it difficult to breathe the rarefied air of these
disputes. Nevertheless, I think I see the connection between this tenet
and the system-oriented approach to social science. The systemic view
says that large human aggregates can be viewed as systems, each charac-
terized by a structure; that is, a network of relations among its elements,
including patterns of interaction among them. The &dquo; primacy of being
over consciousness &dquo; can be interpreted in a methodological context instead
of a metaphysical one. As a methodological prescription, the tenet says
that the way people see and interpret their world (consciousness) can be
better understood on the basis of some knowledge of the system of
which they are a part (being) than the behavior of the system can be
understood from the way the constituents seem to perceive the world
(consciousness).
In Marxist writings, couched largely in 19th century philosophical
terminology, the presumed laws governing the macro-social systems are
declared to be manifestations of &dquo; objective reality &dquo;, while ideologies,
world views, ethical imperatives, etc., are assumed to be manifestations
of &dquo; consciousness &dquo;; i.e., &dquo; subjective &dquo;, hence derivative. Thus the
&dquo; 
primacy of sociology over psychology &dquo; (to put it crudely) is equated
to the primacy of 
&dquo; 
matter over mind &dquo;.
I believe this dichotomy to be something carried over from Cartesian
dualism, and I very much doubt whether it continues to serve any construc-
tive philosophical purpose. If the materialist view is to be carried to its
logical conclusion, then &dquo; consciousness 
&dquo; 
can also be interpreted mate-
rialistically, namely as a state of a nervous system, defined by an instan-
taneous distribution within it of electric potentials, chemical gradients,
etc. Thereby the need of the materialist to view all reality as a configuration
of matter is satisfied. Note, however, that if this view is strictly adhered
to, then there is no logical inconsistency in viewing &dquo; consciousness 
&dquo;
(in its materialist interpretation, that is) as 
&dquo; 
primary &dquo;, and the &dquo; laws
governing the transformations of society &dquo; as 
&dquo; 
secondary &dquo;. Indeed,
such a view would actually be an expression of the ultimate goal of analytic
methodology. Recall the derivations of planetary orbits from the infi-
nitesimal elements of motion, of the gross thermodynamic laws from
molecular motion, of the properties of compounds from atomic theory,
and, more recently, of the properties of atoms from the electronic and
nuclear structures - all triumphs of analytic methodology. The mate-
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rialist’s dream could well be the derivation of history from the laws of
neurophysiology ! t
The dream, however, is not realistic, at least not now. One reason
is the sheer magnitude of the task. Another more important reason is
that we have no assurance that our repertoire of concepts is sufficient
to undertake the task even if it were manageable. Of the above listed
successes of the analytic approach, only the first (celestial mechanics)
can be credited to &dquo; pure &dquo; analysis. The orbits of planets were indeed
derived from infinitesimal elements of motion. Note, however, that
this was done in an extremely simple context - that of the two-body
problem. In higher celestial mechanics it already became necessary to
invoke &dquo; holistic &dquo; (macro-system) concepts, for example, Hamilton’s
Principle. Here it can still be argued that the analytic approach was
not by-passed, since Hamilton’s Principle is, after all, derivable from
mechanics. However, as has been pointed out, already in thermodynamics
principles had to be invoked which had not yet been derived from mechanics;
e.g., the heat equivalent of work, the maximization of entropy, etc.
The same is true of other successes of analytic methodology. Che-
mistry was well under way before Dalton’s atomic hypothesis became
its foundation, and quite mature long before the gross structure of the
atom (not to speak of the structure of the nucleus) was discovered. In
all these instances, the repertoire of concepts had to be considerably enlarged
(while the investigations of the &dquo; higher &dquo; contexts was in progress) before
the link between the more &dquo; fundamental &dquo; levels and the higher levels
could be established. The concepts of the &dquo; fundamental &dquo; levels simply
did not su~ce for the construction of the higher level theories. The
&dquo; fault &dquo; is not in nature, but in us. We simply do not have sufficient
memory capacity to operate on all levels with only the fundamental con-
cepts. Think of what an impossible task it would be, for example, to
develop all of mathematics using exclusively the concepts of set theory
or of symbolic logic, even though a reduction of all mathematical concepts
to the latter might be shown to be possible. Whitehead and Russell
attempted the task, but they could undertake it only after the mathematical
edifice had been contructed in its main outlines.
If it were possible to derive sociology from neurophysiology, then
the Marxist tenet (implying the &dquo; objectivity &dquo; of social processes as against
the &dquo; subjectivity 
&dquo; of psychological processes) would be refuted by the
materialist thesis itself! In the light of this thesis, the psychological
processes are just as 
&dquo; 
objective &dquo; (in the sense of being manifestations
of material events in the nervous system) as the social processes; and also
they are more &dquo; fundamental &dquo;, being events on a 
&dquo; lower &dquo; level of reality.
However, this philosophically conceived &dquo; primacy of psychology 
&dquo;
does not, at least today, seem to be of much practical methodological
consequence. The understanding of social phenomena has become an
urgent need ever since the radical transformation of society has accelerated
to the point where it is visible during a normal life span. We must therefore
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resort to holistic system approaches and forego, at least for the time being,
the ultimate goal of the analytic method. This is a methodological (not
a metaphysical) justification for the primacy of sociology over psychology;
in Marxist terms, of the &dquo; objective &dquo; social dynamics over consciousness.
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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
Of the specific consequences of this view I think the most challenging
and important is the idea of the sociology of knowledge. In the Marxist
formulation, as is well known, the roles assigned in the productive process
stratify societies into classes, and the class interest of each stratum shapes
its view of the world, in particular, its epistemology. Thus the macro-
system exerts an influence on its constituent parts. In my opinion, it
has been an immensely fruitful view when applied to the analysis of political
ideologies and of the ethos of Western countries, beginning with the rise
of mercantilism through the Industrial Revolution to the growth of socialist-
communist labor movements. I do not know to what extent this view
can be extended to other cultures or other eras. I think also that the most
impressive manifestations of the class-interest-determined world views
are those which reveal themselves in political philosophies. I do not
know to what extent class interest reveals itself in other aspects of the
world view. Of particular interest are the apparent sources of Western
liberalism, rooted in the axiom of natural rights (individual freedom)
that has been interpreted by the Marxists as the sublimated expression of
the class interest of the bourgeoisie. The capitalist mode of production
rests on the commodity market, in which labor is also a commodity. Conse-
quently, contractual obligations must be given precedence over status
obligations. Labor, therefore, must be 
&dquo; 
free &dquo;; that is, free to be bought
and sold. Mobility of the population must be assured, since new indus-
trial sites spring up near newly discovered or captured sources of raw
materials. Moreover, expanding technology requires expanding education
and expanding physical science, which, in turn, go hand in hand with
freedom of thought and expression. Put these together and you have
the 19th century liberal view pressing for the abolition of serfdom
(or slavery in the United States), for universal suffrage, civil rights, edu-
cation of the masses, and a reliance on science (of the 19th century).
The same attitudes, persisting in the 20th century, have frozen
into a dogma and have in many instances impeded societies from adapting
to changing conditions. The United States offers a dramatic example
of this lag. The dominant view of society in the United States has been
an atomistic one, rooted in the Arcadian ideal of Jefferson who pictured
the future of America as that of a nation of free-holders, each maximally
self-sufficient and beholden to no one. As the society became urbanized
and commercialized, the &dquo; small businessman &dquo; supplanted the free-
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holder as the archetype for democracy. This ideal still persists in
nostalgic images and inspires the ideological formulations of the political
Right.
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES
Now, what strikes me about the materialist interpretation of the
so-called free enterprise ideology is that it is so much more convincing
when applied to the early stages of American society than to its later stages.
The relation between the needs of the entrepreneur class, operating in
an internally expanding economy, and individualistic ethos (especially
in its Puritan garb) is quite apparent. The principal character in 19th
century America was the entrepreneur, and he could operate &dquo; best 
&dquo;
only if he was completely unencumbered by any obligations except those
involving monetary transactions; only if the drive from which he derived
his energy (or his unlimited appetite) was not only tolerated but actually
adulated in the prevailing mores.
It is needless to point out that the America of the late 20th century
is quite unlike that of the late 19th. The driving, grabbing entre-
preneur, tycoon, empire builder is no longer the archetype, certainly
not the ideal of social virtue. If Horatio Alger wrote today, who would
read him? The Puritan world view was effectively shattered in the Great
Depression and replaced by the &dquo; 20th century liberal &dquo; view in which
the idea of the welfare state (within the framework of &dquo; free enterprise &dquo;)
finds various degrees of assent.
In the climax of the &dquo; liberal era &dquo;, that is, on the eve of the Vietnam
War, the favorite theme of the anti-Marxist liberals in the United States
has been that of alleged democratization of capitalism. Indeed, it was
possible to deny that the capitalism of the 1960’s bore any recognizable
resemblance to that of the 1880’s. The tycoons vanished from public
view. The corporations became de-personalized and appeared to be
operating within socially imposed regulations. Beginning with 1933
the United States made significant strides toward catching up with the
technologically advanced countries of Europe in social legislation and
welfare. Above all, at least the skilled worker population had been pre-
empted into the vast middle class, so that until the outbreak of the campus
and ghetto rebellions, it was difficult to refute the argument that ideology
was dead in American political life.
It wasn’t, of course. It only seemed as if ideology was supplanted
by pragmatic problem-solving modes of thought. The reason ideology
seems to have &dquo; petered out &dquo; in the United States in the 1950’s was because
no counter-ideology challenged the established &dquo; mainstream &dquo; ideology.
(An ideology, like the axiomatic foundation of a deductive system, is
visible only against a background of its negation.)
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Nevertheless, as the 1960’s progressed a very different picture emerged.
Suddenly a full-fledged ideological struggle flared up, the Establishment
having become a target of an onslaught comparable in fury to the onslaught
against the ancien rigime on the eve of the French Revolution. And
here is what appears at first thought to be an embarrassing difficulty for
Marxist theory : the ideological clash developed, but not across the tra-
ditional seams of class structure.
To be sure, to the extent that one can speak of the emergence of a
&dquo; 
revolutionary mass &dquo; in the United States, the black ghetto is the closest
thing to it. But it is precisely here that the struggle lacks genuine ideolo-
gical content. The Black Power slogans are desperate outcries against
immediate outrages rather than an ideology in the making. To the extent
that Black Power leaders attempt to provide an ideological base for a
revolutionary movement, they give a faltering, sorry performance, mixing
a naively romanticized image of African pre-history with a primitive,
debilitating racism, which mirrors the idea of South African apartheid.
The Black Power movement is at its best when it makes immediate, concrete
demands, and engages people in organized efforts to seize local political
control. But these are precisely the non-ideological aspects of the struggle.
Ironically, demands of rights and political maneuvers are the established
methods of social conflict in American society. So, in this respect, the
black people constitute just another pressure group, not a new social class
with an emergent class consciousness, imbued with a new ideology. The
sociological argument of the end-of-ideology enthusiasts is precisely that
social conflict in the United States (and in other technologically advanced
countries) is among pressure groups, not social classes. The pressure
groups engage in conflicts of interest within a single framework of thought
(which to the anti-ideologists appears pragmatic, hence non-ideological)
in the same way that commercial firms compete for shares of the market.
The situation is quite different among the strata of American society
where alienation from the &dquo; mainstream &dquo; stems from the role which
the United States has assumed in the world. Here an ideology is emerging
as a challenge to the traditional &dquo; liberal &dquo; world view; and in the light
of this dialectic opposition the latter now appears to the alienated as a
reactionary ideology. The challenge is to the notion that in exercising
its power the United States is exercising &dquo; leadership &dquo;.
Ideological opposition to the conduct of the United States on the
world scene began at, the very start of the Cold War. In the beginning,
however, it was rather narrowly confined to the remnant of the Old Left.
The Old Left had depended for its ideological nourishment largely on a
solidarity with the Soviet Union, which appeared in the Litvinov period
1934-1938 as the only reliable bulwark against the onslaughts of the tota-
litarian aggressor states. Already then, however, this identification was
befuddled by the Stalinist Terror of 1937-1938. It was all but shattered
by the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. The pro-Soviet orientation was revived
in 1941, only to be dealt another blow by the second explosion of Stalinist
,
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xenophobia in the late forties. The failure of the Wallace presidential
campaign in 1948, and the McCarthy witch-hunt mark the lowest ebb
of the Old (pro-Soviet) Left. For this reason, opposition to the Cold
War, which was at first practically confined to the remnants of this stratum,
was extremely weak in the early 1950’s. Opposition began to gather
momentum in 1956. The factors contributing to the resurgence were,
first, de-Stalinization, then the establishment of the nuclear balance of
terror (about 1960), then the overt commitment of the United States to
military &dquo; containment of communism &dquo; by suppressing revolutions.
The intensification of the opposition brought on, as might have been expect-
ed, a militant support of Cold War policies. I am speaking now not
of the conditioned reflex type of support characteristic of the American
business community (in which the organized labor leadership must now
be included), of the mass media, etc., but of active ideologically rationalized
support by the intellectual leadership of the Liberal Establishment. In
essence, this support echoes the Administration’s pronouncements about
America’s mission in the &dquo; defense of the free world &dquo;. The ideological
basis is provided by identifying &dquo; national interests &dquo; of the United States
with the interest of humanity. The role of the United States is presented
by the intellectual apologists of American foreign policy as that of guiding
the world along the path of orderly development toward affluence and
democracy. To accomplish this task, the United States must (it is main-
tained) render its power (which is seen as 
&dquo; 
peace-keeping &dquo; power) unassai-
lable. Hence, it is argued, the United States is justified in using its military
might whenever and wherever this power is challenged.
’j
PROJECTION OF THE LIBERAL
AND MARXIST THESES S TO THE WORLD SCALE
It seems to me that this image is the extension to the world arena
of the liberal anti-Marxist ideology developed in the West in the past
fifty years. The issue between Marxism and Liberalism, it will be recalled,
was the question of the role of the class struggle in social change. Marxist
extrapolation of the trends initiated by the Industrial Revolution predicted
a progressive impoverishment of the working classes, a growth of class
consciousness in them, culminating in an organized political struggle,
the seizure of political power (i.e., of the state apparatus, including its
instruments of coercion), and a re-organization of society in accordance
with the interests of the working class, leading to the final abolition of
classes. If the history of the United States and of Western Europe is
examined in isolation (that is, without reference to the rest of the world),
the Marxist thesis appears to have been refuted. The working classes
in the technologically advanced countries have not been pauperized;
the proletariat has not engulfed the middle class ; on the contrary, the
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middle class, having changed its economic base, has engulfed a large
sector of the would-be proletariat. Nor has the &dquo; state apparatus 
&dquo;
remained essentially an instrument of internal coercion. In the United
States, the compliance of the population with the interests of the business
community is assured far more effectively and, for the most part, uninten-
tionally by subtle and diffuse means of persuasion. Finally, the welfare
state, exemplified by the small democratic countries of Europe, resembles
a realization of the aspirations of 19th century socialists, and the
anti-Marxists are quick to point out that this development came about
without any visible manifestation of the processes envisaged in Marxist
models.
In doing so, the anti-Marxists omit a salient fact of recent history,
namely that, on a world scale, the masses are being progressively impo-
verished ; that the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing; that
in the world as a whole (in contrast to the technologically advanced countries)
a revolutionary consciousness is increasing; that the methods of suppress-
ing revolutionary outbursts in the underdeveloped countries do resemble
those of the police of capitalist states in the days when the labor movements
in those states were revolutionary.
In other words, on the world scale, the classical Marxist picture of
the class struggle is seen rather clearly, even though it is obscured in those
portions of the world which Marx had singled out for attention. In
certain respects, therefore, we are witnessing a vindication of the Marxist
model. There are, however, important discrepancies which must be
recognized if the Marxist model is to be brought into conformity with
recent historical experience.
First, the Marxist model assigned the revolutionary role to the indus-
trial proletariat. The industrial workers now form an integral part of
bourgeois society in the rich Western countries, in the sense of having
a stake in preserving important features of these societies. In particular,
in the United States the industrial workers, at least by their official political
stance, support the goals of the ruling elite. Whatever revolutionary
energy stemming from class consciousness exists in the world today seems
to be vested in the dispossessed populations of the technologically under-
developed countries, not in an industrial proletariat of advanced countries,
as envisaged by Marx.
Second, if we redraw the &dquo; class lines &dquo; so that they correspond
to a confrontation between the advanced countries (in the role of the
owning class protecting its privileges) and the starving masses of the ex-
colonial world, we are faced with the prospect that bears only a superficial
resemblance to the social revolution as it was envisaged in the Marxist
model. The proletariat which was expected to 
&dquo; seize power &dquo; in Marxist
eschatology was a highly disciplined, organized social unit. It was destined
to carry out a revolution in a society already highly organized, thereby
gaining control of already existing institutions. On the other hand, the
social revolution envisaged as a world war between the urban and the
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rural worlds (as, for example, in Chinese eschatology) has none of these
features. If such a war were to occur (incidentally with the U.S.S.R. on
the side of the rich, which is part of the same vision), it is difficult to see
anything emerging from the resulting holocaust that remotely resembles
an organized socialist society. The Maoist vision, while it captures
certain important aspects of the impending struggle, is still too swathed
in romantic fog to be seriously considered as a variant of, or a successor
to, the classical Marxist model of social revolution.
A struggle is indeed shaping up on the world scale between those
who represent entrenched power and those who represent the aspirations
of humanity; but it seems to me that the lines of that struggle can no longer
be drawn along the same chasm that separated the economic classes of
Europe from each other in the nineteenth century.
If we turn our attention once again to the ideological strife now raging
in the United States, we can only conclude that its momentum cannot
be provided by a class struggle in the traditional sense. As I have said,
the bulk of organized labor and certainly most of its bureaucratized leader-
ship (it has no other) supports both the goals and the methods of United
States imperialism. Articulate and sustained opposition to the goals
of the American power elite originated in sectors of the academic and
the religious communities, and, to the extent that it has spread, it has
penetrated all social strata without apparent relevance to discernible eco-
nomic interests.
On the other hand, it does seem that the classical theory of imperialist
expansion (propelled by the dynamics of monopoly capitalism) still provides
a rather convincing explanation of the role assumed by the United States
in world affairs. In other words, Marxist doctrine of economic dynamics
still seems to be an adequate theoretical basis of large scale global events
(to the exent that these are instigated by pressures acting on the power
elite); but Marxist sociology of knowledge, in its original formulation,
does not seem to account for the ideological divisions prevailing in our
era. In its classical version, it fails to explain the ideological rift between
Chinese and Soviet elites. If, instead of the classical doctrine, the Maoist
version is adopted, this places the Soviet Union and its allies in the &dquo; capi-
talist camp &dquo;, in which case nothing remains of 
&dquo; the world industrial
proletariat &dquo; as a bearer of a socialist revolution.
Specifically, Marxist sociology of knowledge is inadequate to account
for the ideological struggle within the United States. To be sure, in the
Maoist version this struggle may be of no consequence (as the struggle
between liberals and conservatives was viewed by the communists in
the 1920’s and 1930’s). But it must not be dismissed on that account.
While the prospects of restraining American imperialism from inside the
United States are not bright, the impact of the protest movement should
not be discounted. It may well contribute to the creation of a climate
of world opinion which will make it increasingly difficult for the United
States to carry out its self-assumed role as the Defender of the Faith.
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Finally, the threat of the nuclear holocaust is a factor in our time
that has not the remotest analogue in the 19th century. The ruling
classes of the 19th century prepared, as a matter of routine, to wage
wars against each other in the pursuit of their &dquo; national &dquo; and imperialist
interests. Today the only great power waging or preparing to wage wars
of aggression is the United States; and it is taken for granted by its military
establishment that these wars will be normally &dquo; limited wars &dquo;, with the
objective of suppressing revolutions, and only iii extremis a total war, envi-
saged as a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union or both. In the
rest of the capitalist world, war has ceased to be viewed as an instrument
of national aggrandizement, while in most communist countries war is
envisaged only as a defense against the onslaught of the United States.
These radical changes in the conception of war have inevitably introduced
into ideology new factors difficult to relate to 
&dquo; class interests &dquo;. While
in the days of mass armies the burdens of war were largely borne by the
masses and escaped by the elites, the nuclear bomb does not recognize
class distinctions. It is an anomaly, but not an accident, that there is
more opposition to American military adventures in the business commu-
nity than in the ranks of organized labor.
Marxist philosophy laid the foundations of a sociology of knowledge.
But this version of the sociology of knowledge, which provided an intri-
guing and provocative explanation of the clashing ideologies of the past
centuries, cannot be expected to give us additional insights into the events
of our era. We have witnessed social upheavals which only a pedant
would insist on explaining in terms of the broad outlines of social dynamics
bequeathed by Marx.
In particular, we need to know a great deal more about &dquo; social biology &dquo;.
Human aggregates share certain characteristics with organisms. This
is hardly surprising. Among lower forms of life the boundary between
&dquo; individual &dquo; and &dquo; aggregate &dquo; is often not clear. A colony of social
insects, for example, is an organism in many of its aspects, related to its
constituent individuals as the latter are related to the cells that compose
them. Cybernetics has revealed a great deal about the behavior of complex
systems as they are determined by the interactions of their parts regardless
of the specific nature of these systems; whether, for example, they are
mechanical, chemical, or electrical; whether living or dead. Possibly
a great deal can be revealed about social systems by the use of the general
methods developed in cybernetics, which, incidentally, are already shown
to be relevant to economics. They may also be relevant to macro-social
psychology, which is essentially the content of the sociology of knowledge.
However, if we are to take a cue from cybernetics, we must abandon the
hope of discovering &dquo; laws &dquo; that can be stated in ordinary language in
which it has been possible to enunciate only the most elementary of the
so-called &dquo; laws of nature &dquo;. The behavior of complex organized systems
is governed not by simply stated &dquo; laws &dquo; but by intricate networks of
inter-relations which constitute the organization of the systems. For
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this reason the so-called &dquo; laws of development of societies 
&dquo; stated verbally
as general principles (analogous to the conservation laws of physics or
the principle of natural selection in biology) are not likely to yield more
than they have already yielded.
We need to know a great deal more about how &dquo; reality &dquo; is transform-
ed in being perceived by man. It is not enough to resort to a metaphor,
as Lenin did in his &dquo; doctrine of reflection &dquo;. This model served the
purpose of reiterating the &dquo; primacy of matter over mind &dquo; (by negating
the autonomy of 
&dquo; mind &dquo;), but it tells us nothing of how reality is reflected
in consciousness. Marx’s sociology of knowledge says a great deal about
how perceptions of reality are refracted (not reflected) by class interests,
but to insist that this is a sufficient &dquo; explanation &dquo; of the differences among
perceptions and commitments is to shut off further inquiry.
We know that between our consciousness and reality there is inter-
posed a screen of language. For the most part we do not observe reality
directly but only via the images projected on that screen. These images are
formed by verbal categories which constitute the content of most of our
thoughts. The verbal categories enter our lives at an age when we are
not in a position to examine critically the correspondence between them
and non-verbal experience. The verbal categories organize our experiences
into concepts which, in turn, serve as a framework into which further
experiences are fitted. Experiences which do not fit the established frame-
works are not likely to be registered at all. The propensity to identify
verbal categories with reality makes us vulnerable to all sorts of persuasive
manipulation, including demagogy. Indeed, the insulation from direct
experience effected by the verbal screen seems to be a plausible explanation
of how it comes about that masses can be induced to act against their
class interests. On the other hand, the power of symbols suggests that
at times cohesive groups are motivated by pressures difficult or impossible
to relate to the roles the groups play in the productive process (e.g., national-
ism, religious zeal, symbolic social status, etc.).
Marxism has paid little attention to this dimension of social reality.
Taking note of this omission does not detract from Marx’s achievement
in having laid the foundations of an analysis of the sociology of knowledge
based on the interaction of demonstrable class interests, and ought not
to be avoided because of (real or imagined) 
&dquo; threats &dquo; to the Marxist
world view.
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Of all the contributions of Marxism to our intellectual heritage, Marxist
philosophy of history is, perhaps, the furthest removed from currently
prevailing Western views. It is frankly an eschatological doctrine, a
view of history as the unfolding of a scheme and the attainment of a goal.
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Marx’s intellectual debt to Hegel is common knowledge. Indeed, Marx’s
achievement is seen by the Marxists as that of having turned Hegel right
side up; i.e., having put Hegel’s evolutionary philosophy of history on
a solid materialist base.
In our day, the optimistic prognoses of Marxist eschatology are not
easy to accept, especially in the West. For one thing, the conception
of evolution as &dquo; progress &dquo; has become ambivalent, not to say suspect.
All progress must be defined in terms of goals, that is, in teleological terms.
But the teleological point of view has suffered many serious reverses.
The realization of a Divine Purpose is no longer taken seriously except
by believers, who no longer enjoy a hegemony in philosophy. To be sure,
Marxism has expunged Divine Purpose from its theory of social evolution
by substituting 
&dquo; laws of historical development 
&dquo; for Hegel’s realization
of the Idea. However, these &dquo; laws of historical development &dquo; amount
at best to no more than an extrapolation of selected historical trends
combined with an aspiration for a just social order. The &dquo; inevitability &dquo;
of the just social order is argued on the premise of the cooperative
nature of modern production. Implicit in the argument, however, is
the assumption that an organized society will survive as a matrix of
human existence. There is no way of justifying this assumption ; indeed,
no way of justifying the assumption that man as a species can long
survive.
The ephemeral nature of all hitherto existing social orders bascd
on the exploitation of man by man is argued by the Marxists on the grounds
that every exploitative social order brings about a class struggle and so
carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. The end of this process
is foreseen in the establishment of a social order in which the fruits of labor
of some are not appropriated by others. The implication is that &dquo; appro-
priation of the fruits of labor &dquo; is the only important form of exploitation.
This may well have been the case when domination was motivated and
maintained by the opportunities it provided for avoiding toil. But must
this be the case when the necessity for toil has been removed from human
life ? Do we not find ample evidence of a vast variety of contexts in which
domination occurs, seemingly unrelated to appropriation of the fruits
of others’ labor? Do men struggle for power only to make others toil
for them? Was the usurpation of total power by Stalin motivated by
Stalin’s (or for that matter his bureaucracy’s) desire to avoid toil? As
a matter of fact, the modern dictator is typically an indefatigable, dedi-
cated toiler, often a severe ascetic. In the past, Marxists went to great
lengths to avoid even posing such questions, let along grappling with them,
probably because the idea that debilitating and disruptive conflicts may
develop even in the &dquo; classless society &dquo; was seen by them as damaging
theory. In particular, orthodox Marxists were quick to dismiss summarily
any approach to the study of man that puts at the point of departure
the psychological make-up of man derived from his biological heritage.
For example, it has always been difficult to induce an orthodox Marxist
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to close his eyes for a moment on man as a producer and consumer of
commodities in order to see him as a complex of unconscious drives; that
is, as an animal organism, as he is pictured, say in the Freudian model.
The Marxists nurture an impregnable faith in man’s ability to shake himself
loose from the blind, propelling forces of history and to take his fate into
his own hands.
Although the optimistic historicism of Marxist philosophy is challeng-
eable on the grounds of a disturbing accumulation of evidence concerning
the possibly inherent inadequacies of man as a species, one aspect of this
philosophy endows it with a certain credibility. Predictions made in
the context of human affairs are different from predictions made about
the non-human world, in that such predictions are frequently self-realizing
(or self-refuting). Significantly, the self-realizing aspect of Marxist philo-
sophy of history is an explicitly recognized part of that philosophy; so
that, in it, the predictive and the prescriptive modes of discourse are not
separable. (The obverse side of this aspect is expressed in Engels’ apho- -
rism : &dquo; Freedom is the recognition of necessity &dquo;.) To put it bluntly, what
man is and what he will become is not entirely determined by a set of
&dquo; 
objective conditions &dquo; but also in part by what man believes he is or
will become. Curiously, this argument was used by Karl Popper as a
refutation of what he conceived to be Marxist historicism, whereas the
merging of prediction and choice (of freedom and necessity) is the very
essence of Marxist historicism. Thus the Marxist prediction of the growing
class consciousness of the European working class became for a time a
determining condition of the emergence of that consciousness.
This self-predictive component of man’s evaluation of himself, in
particular of historical prognosis, must be kept constantly in mind. In
making historical prognoses we are not merely estimating the course
of events, and consequently are assuming responsibility for them. There-
fore the ideal of scientific objectivity cannot be strictly applied to the context
of historical prognosis, unless one is impervious to one’s responsibility
as a human being. Unlike meteorological predictions, historical predic-
tions involve an ethical choice. The recognition of this principle is, in
my opinion, the most important intellectual legacy of Marxist philosophy
of history.
To summarize, Marxism was the first systematic attempt to apply
insights obtained from an analysis of social dynamics (by means of tools
then available) to both the prediction and the direction of the course of
history. The distinction between the two is not sharp in Marxist philo-
sophy, which declares that the understanding of the world is conferred
on man by efforts to change the world. C. Wright Mills put it picturesquely
when he said that the surest way to be convinced of the &dquo; reality &dquo; of the
power elite is by trying to buck it. Conversely, understanding the forces
which propel the evolution of society confers upon man the power to
direct these forces. It would be a grievous mistake to view the Marxist
synthesis as the last as well as the first one of its kind. If a philosophy of
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history is to be a serviceable tool (a &dquo; weapon &dquo;, as the Marxists are fond
of saying) for carrying out the aspirations of humanity, it must not be
allowed to freeze into a dogma. All the protestations of non-commitment
to dogma notwithstanding, the record of the politically practising Marxists
(i.e., those in the position of leadership in communist states) has not been
good in this respect. A certain ossification of doctrine is understandable
and even excusable in men who must make risky decisions and rationalize
them on &dquo; scientific &dquo; grounds. But it is most unfortunate if ossification
is permitted on the intellectual level; that is, in the minds of thinkers not
obliged to make quick and far-reaching political decisions. Those whose
business it is to develop a science of man-in-society should not only be
free but also should feel free to construct a great variety of models and
theories, to challenge or modify existing ones, to offer alternative inter-
pretations ; in short, to do everything that scientists do to scientific theories,
and philosophers do to philosophy. It may well be that in the light of
new insights and experiences little will be left that resembles the original
formulations of Marxism. But this will by no means imply that Marxism
will have been discarded or corrupted or diluted. We do not negate
our childhood by becoming men; nor do we debase the insights of our
teachers by outgrowing them.
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